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10.1  Introduction 
Although Hong Kong is  often regarded as a classic showcase of  the 
laissez faire economy, the intervening hand of the government is clearly 
visible in some of its most important sectors. In utilities, public transporta- 
tion, securities, and housing, the markets are highly regulated. The recent 
process of democratization has also created significant political pressure 
to introduce even more regulations in these and other sectors. Neverthe- 
less, between late 1994 and early 1995, a process of deregulating the in- 
terest rate cap was  imposed by  the Hong Kong Association of  Banks 
(HKAB). 
The study of deregulation in Hong Kong’s banking sector is of interest 
for several reasons. First, before the deregulation, the HKAB was a power- 
ful cartel, but afterward, its members had to engage in more fierce compe- 
tition. This shift provides an opportunity for comparing the behaviors of 
banks operating under different market structures. Second, the transition 
from monopoly to competition often increases risks and reduces profits. 
These could cause failures of more vulnerable banks, as happened in the 
United States after the interest rate deregulation of  the early 1980s. On 
the other hand, Hong Kong’s transition has been relatively fast and suc- 
cessful. The banks appear to have absorbed the policy shock smoothly. 
Analyzing the experience of Hong Kong may shed light on the conditions 
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that are needed for a stable transition.  Third, having  183 fully licensed 
banks and with 85 of the world’s top 100 banks being represented, Hong 
Kong is one of the largest international centers of banking. In  1995, its 
daily foreign exchange trading surpassed that of Switzerland to become 
the world’s fifth most active (Carse 1995a). Events happening in  such a 
major center may have long-lasting effects on the world’s financial mar- 
kets. 
The main objectives of this paper are to analyze how Hong Kong banks 
have optimally responded to the interest rate deregulation and why it has 
so far not caused any bank failures. To do this, we  shall present the argu- 
ments in several steps. In section 10.2 we  provide the general background 
of  the deregulation of  1994-95.  In section 10.3 we  present some crude 
indicators of the banks’ new strategies. Section 10.4 discusses the method- 
ology that we  use to decompose the changes in the banks’ cost and profit 
functions into (1) the effects of bank-initiated responses to the new regula- 
tory structure and (2) the effects of changes in the external environment. 
Separating these two effects is important because we can then assess how 
much of the success is due to luck and how much is due to banks’ optimiz- 
ing behaviors. The empirical results based on this methodology are pre- 
sented and interpreted in section 10.5. Section 10.6 uses a simple capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) to estimate the changes in the risks of banks 
that are listed on Hong Kong’s stock market. This is necessary for com- 
pleting the argument because risk management is one of the instruments 
that banks can use to mitigate the impact of deregulation. Finally, con- 
cluding remarks are made in section 10.7. 
10.2  Institutional Background 
The banking cartel in Hong Kong can be traced back a hundred years. 
In 1897, the Exchange Banks’ Association (EBA) was established. It could 
only be joined by  authorized banks, which used it as a forum for fixing 
banking charges and agreed rates of buying and selling foreign exchange. 
However, the rules were not mandatory, but similar to a gentlemen’s agree- 
ment (Ghose 1995). 
In the early 1960s there was a cutthroat interest war among the banks 
in Hong Kong. Some British banks decided to raise the deposit interest 
rate by  1 percentage point. It was widely interpreted by Chinese banks as 
an attempt to monopolize the market (Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 
April 1965). The EBA proposed to form an agreement among all banks, 
whether they were members of the association or not, for a uniform inter- 
est rate structure. After a prolonged process of negotiation and pressure, 
an agreement materialized in July 1964. There would be no interest paid 
for demand and seven-day-notice deposits. Interest rates for savings and 
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Loans and advances were not regulated, but it was against the Money 
Lenders’ Ordinance of  1911 to charge an interest rate of more than 60 
percent per annum. The agreement was mandatory. Banks contravening 
it would be denied access to clearinghouse facilities and barred from in- 
terbank exchange and fund dealings (Ghose 1995). It is sometimes be- 
lieved that the agreement at that time probably saved some small banks 
from collapse (e.g., see Jao 1992, chap. 26). 
The EBA was replaced by the Hong Kong Association of Banks in 1980. 
The Hong Kong Association of Banks Ordinance made this a statutory 
body, and its rules were legally binding. Bankers were no longer required 
to observe the rules of the Money Lenders’ Ordinance and could lend at 
any interest rate. A set of rules on maximum interest rates for different 
types of deposits and minimum bank charges were laid down. Decisions 
on the maximum base rates were made by the Committee of the HKAB, 
in consultation with the financial secretary of the Hong Kong government. 
Banks were free to offer lower rates. Deposits of  at least HK$500,000, 
foreign currency deposits, time deposits of fifteen months and longer, and 
deposits taken by unincorporated banks were exempted (KO 1991). 
Because the Hong Kong dollar has been pegged to the U.S. dollar at 
the rate of 7.8 since 1983, interest rates of the former are heavily influenced 
by the latter. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the inflation rate in Hong 
Kong has been significantly higher than that in the United States. This 
has created a negative real interest rate situation in Hong Kong for a pro- 
longed period.’ The public has from time to time pressed for the removal 
of the “interest rate rules” outlined above. For example, a report issued by 
the Consumer Council (1994) argued that the spread between the prime 
rate and the regulated savings (or time deposit) rate was on average about 
1.7 percentage points higher than those in other countries. The spread 
between the prime and the unregulated interbank lending rate was closely 
in line with international standards. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA), the de facto central bank of Hong Kong established in 1993, 
finally decided to deregulate the interest rate cap in several phases. 
On  1 October 1994, the HKMA removed the interest rate cap on all 
relevant time deposits of maturity more than one month. There was no 
deregulation of current and savings account deposits. On 3 January 1995, 
those with a maturity of  over seven days were also deregulated (Carse 
1995a). The HKMA originally planned to implement the third phase on 
1 April 1995. This would have covered Hong Kong dollar time deposits 
fixed for more than twenty-four hours. However, the short-term volatile 
environment  caused  by  the  Mexican  crisis  and  the  Barings  collapse 
1. This is one of the reasons why the proportion of M3 in foreign-currency-denominated 
assets has been staying at the high level of over 40 percent. Foreign currency deposits are 
not subject to the interest rate cap (see Jao 1992, chap. 26). 308  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T.  Lui 
changed the mind of the HKMA. It decided to defer the third phase so 
that a review of the situation up to the end of June could be done (HKMA 
1995). The review led to the conclusion  to move one more step. Time 
deposits of  seven days were deregulated. Further deregulation was  not 
entirely off the agenda, but for practical purposes the current program had 
come to an end. Over 99 percent of time deposits covered by the former 
interest rate rules had been deregulated. 
The HKMA seemed to be cautious in implementing the steps. Fearing 
that the deregulation could reduce banks’ profits by too much, it did not 
do anything to current and savings deposits. Time deposits of less than 
seven days’ maturity remained regulated so that there would be no destabi- 
lizing migration from current and savings deposits to short-term time de- 
posits. The basic problem faced by the HKMA seemed to be how the cap 
could be removed safely. This concern was based on the belief that the 
possible erosion of profits could lead banks to take excessive risks that 
would weaken their positions in times of major external shocks. However, 
it was judged that the market had absorbed the deregulation well (Carse 
1995a). Banks had become more active sellers of their products rather 
than passive providers of services. More innovations such as electronic 
and card products were introduced in the competitive and riskier environ- 
ment (Carse 1995b). 
It should also be  noted that after the establishment  of the HKMA, 
banks have been required to disclose more of their financial information. 
This may be important for the public because there is no insurance for 
bank deposits in Hong Kong. The disclosure requirement has also prob- 
ably restrained banks from taking positions that are too risky. 
10.3  Some Anecdotal Evidence 
In this section, we  present  and discuss some summary statistics that 
compare banks’ situations before and after the deregulation. The purpose 
is to offer an illustration of the effects of removing the interest rate cap. 
This also serves to motivate the more rigorous analysis in the later sections 
of the paper. 
Table 10.1  contains appropriate sample means derived from annual data 
for twenty-four locally incorporated banks before and after the deregula- 
tion.2 Since the deregulation program started in October 1994 and ended 
a few months later, as an approximation we  have taken  1993-94  as the 
before-deregulation period and 1995-96  as the after-deregulation period. 
Item 10 of table 10.1 shows that the average real profit rate, which is de- 
fined here as the difference between total income (excluding exceptional 
2. Data are from annual reports of the banks and from Hong Kong Bank (various issues). 
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Table 10.1  Summary Statistics of Cost, Income, and  Rate of Profit (per thousand dollars) 
Before Deregulation:  After Deregulation:  Growth Rate 
1993-94  1995-96 
1. Income from service 




3. Exceptional items/TA 
4. Total income/TA 
5. Operating cost/TA 
6. Interest cost/TA 
Interest cost/deposits 
DepositdTA 
7. Bad debt provisionsITA 
8. Total cost/TA 
9. Net interest/TA (2 -  6) 











































Note: TA = total assets. 
items) and total cost (excluding bad debt provisions), divided by the value 
of total assets, actually increased by 2.32 percentage points after the inter- 
est rate was deregulated. Why did the deregulation, which was meant to 
take away the monopoly power of the HUB,  fail to lower the profit rate? 
Inspection of item 6 readily shows that (real) average interest cost went 
up from $30.87 per $1,000 of total assets to $43.98. This was an increase 
of 42.5 percent, confirming the expectation that the more competitive en- 
vironment forced banks to pay a much higher interest cost. Banks, how- 
ever, tried to cut operating cost, where there was an l l .2 percent decline. 
On the income side, interest income went up from $54.31 to $68.20. The 
absolute value of this change was almost the same as the corresponding 
change for interest cost. This implies that the interest rate spread remained 
relatively stable despite the increase in interest cost. The entries in item 9 
support this remark. Closer examination of item 2 suggests that the ratio 
of interest income to total assets went up for two reasons. One was that 
banks were able to earn more interest income per unit of loans lent out. 
The other was that banks tried to lend out more loans. 
We  should recall that the interest rate rules did not apply to banks’ 
lending interest rate, which was determined in the competitive market even 
before the removal of the interest rate cap. Why could banks earn more 
interest after the deregulation? One hypothesis is that banks became more 
aggressive and less discriminating in offering loans. The result would be 
an increase in risk. Item 7 shows that bad debt provisions increased by 
25.4 percent. This is consistent with the hypothesis that bank risk rose. 310  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
Table 10.2  Assets of Banks in Hong Kong (million 1990 HK  dollars) 
Before Deregulation:  After Deregulation:  Growth Rate 
1993-94  1995-96  (“/u) 
Average  60,952 
Maximum  870,436 







All the items in  table  10.1 are expressed in units per $1,000 of  total 
assets. The table does not tell us whether banks succeeded in attracting 
more deposits. If  this happened, the value of banks’ total assets would 
increase. Table 10.2 shows that the average size of banks went up by  15.8 
percent in real terms in the second period. This scale effect, together with 
the increase in profit rate, would raise total profits by  almost 30 percent. 
The story of Hong Kong’s interest rate deregulation cannot be described 
as one involving erosion of profits. 
The above discussion must be regarded as illustrative only. One can al- 
ways argue that the changes in income, cost, and profit were due to unex- 
plained shocks in the environment rather than to banks’ optimal responses 
to the deregulation. To isolate the effects of the deregulation, we  must use 
better methods. Section 10.4 develops a method to address this problem, 
and the results are discussed in section 10.5. The method, however, cannot 
be used to assess the changes in risk. The simple CAPM of section 10.6 
can fill the hole in the analysis. 
10.4  Profit and Cost Functions 
10.4.1  Profit Function 
We study the evolution of the industry’s operating profits by estimating 
a translog profit function with three inputs (labor, capital, and deposits) 
and two outputs (loans and banking services). Variable definitions can be 
found in table 10.3. 
With outputs measured positively and inputs negatively, the profit func- 
tion is defined as 
(1)  n(p) =  max{p’x: x E T}, 
where p  and x are 5  X  1 vectors of  input-output prices and quantities, 
respectively, and T is the production possibility set representing the collec- 
tion of technologically feasible input-output bundles. See Diewert (1982) 
for theoretical discussions of the profit function. Empirically we  adopt a 
translog specification Deregulation, Profit, and Cost in Commercial Banking in Hong Kong  311 
Table 10.3  Variable Definitions 
Variable  Name  Definition 
PI  Price of labor  Salaries and employee benefits divided by 
number of employees 
P2  Price of capital  Occupancy and fixed asset expenditures divided 
by net book value of fixed assets 
P3  Price of deposits  Interest expenses plus other operating expenses 
(unrelated to labor and capital) divided by 
total deposits including certificates of deposit 
Interest income divided by loans (advances + 
trade bills -  provisions) 
P4  Price of loans 
Ps  Price of services  Operating income divided by total assets 
T  Profits  Interest income + operating income -  interest 
expenses -  operating expenses 
See Lau (1978) and Jorgenson (1986) for surveys of the empirical litera- 
ture; recent applications to banking can be found in Hancock (1991), Ber- 
ger,  Humphrey,  and Pulley  (1996), and Humphrey  and  Pulley (1997), 
among many others. From the definition in equation (1) it follows that a 
profit function must be linearly homogeneous in prices, a property that 
translates into a set of restrictions among the parameters of the translog 
profit function: 
(3) 
Upon differentiating the profit function with respect to prices, Hotelling’s 
lemma implies a set of input-output share equations 
(4) 
5 
S,  =  p, + CP,,lnp,,  i  =  1 ,...,  5, 
,=I 
where 
(5)  ,  i=l,  ...,  5. 
The five share equations in (4) are dependent because the shares add to 
one by construction; one of them has to be dropped in estimation. Drop- 
ping  the  last  share equation,  substituting  equation  (3) into equations 
(2) and (4) to eliminate the parameters associated with the last price, and 
appending random disturbances to the remaining equations, we  obtain a 
five-equation system ready for estimation: 312  Yum  K. Kwan and Francis T. Lui 
Assuming normally distributed disturbances, a fully efficient maximum 
likelihood estimate (MLE) can be obtained by Zellner’s iterated seemingly 
unrelated regression (ISUR), with the cross-equation restrictions enforced 
in computing the residual covariance matrix at each iteration. Moreover, 
the MLE is invariant with respect to the choice of which share equation 
to drop. For example, we  would obtain the same result if the first share 
equation, rather than the last one, was dropped. 
The underlying technology of production can be inferred from the dual 
profit function. The Hicks-Allen partial elasticity of transformation can 
be  obtained  by  differentiating the profit  function  and  applying Hotel- 
ling’s lemma: 
IT  ax,  -  IT  ax, 
TZITJ  x,xi JP,  x,x,  JP,’ 
- -~  ITIT,  -  -  - 
rl,  =-  (7) 
where   IT^  and rTT!,  denote, respectively, the first and second partial deriva- 
tives with respect to the subscripted prices. The demand (supply) elasticity 
of input (output) x, with respect to pJ can be  easily calculated, given q, 
and share S,: 
-  (8)  all  =  S,rllJ  - 
For the translog function form, 
(9)  rl,  =  1 
rl,,  =  1 
The translog specification allows a convenient decomposition of profit 
growth attributed to changes in parameters and prices. Let ~(p;  p) and 
 IT(^*; p*) be the profit functions for two periods, with price vectorsp and 
p* and parameter vectors p and p*, respectively. Consider the identity 
(10) 
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The  left-hand  side (in logarithm) is the growth  in  profit  when  (p, p) 
changes to (p*, p*). The right-hand side is a decomposition into marginal 
effects. The logarithm of A is the average of the two hypothetical cases in 
which p changes to p* with prices held constant at p and p*, respectively. 
This is  the profit growth due to parameter change alone. Similarly, the 
logarithm of  B  is the growth in profit due to price change. Using the 
translog profit function, it is possible to further decompose the four mar- 
ginal effects. Let In  p;  = In  pk + A  In pk and p,*  = pj for j  # k. It is 
straightforward to check that 
which is a discrete approximation to the profit elasticity with respect to 
pk. Thus 
5 
(12)  ln.rr(p*;P) -  In.rr(p;P) = c  tE,(p*,P)lnp? - E!(P,P)lnP,l> 
PI 
which is a sum of marginal contributions from each of the five prices, with 
the parameter held constant at p. Similarly, 
(13)  ln.rr(p;P*) - ln.rr(p;@) =  (Pt -  Po) 
+ itE,(P,P*) - E,(P,P)llnP,, 
,=I 
where [E'(p, p*) -  E,(p, p)]lnp, can be interpreted as thejth input-output 
component of the profit growth due to parameter change, with prices held 
constant at p. 
10.4.2  Cost Function 
To  study further the impact of deregulation on the cost side, in particu- 
lar the industry's average cost curve, we  estimate a translog cost function 
with three inputs (labor, capital, and deposits) and one output (loans) of 
the form 
3  l3  lnc  =  Po  + CP,lnp, +  -CCP,lnP,1nPl 
t=1  2 ,=1  '=I  (14) 
3  1 
z=I  2  + p,hY + ~~,,lnpzlnY  +  -PYYln2Y. 
Analogous to the profit function case, cost share equations are generated 
by  applying Shephard's lemma and combined with the cost function to 
form a three-equation system estimated by ISUR, after imposing homoge- 
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The average cost curve (in logarithm) is obtained by simply subtracting 
In  Yon both sides of the total cost function (14). Notice that the curvature 
of the average cost curve is determined by Pry,  which is the second deriva- 
tive of the logarithmic average cost function with respect to In  I: The cost 
curve is U-shaped if  p,,  is positive. Analogous to the profit function case 
discussed above, the translog specification admits a detailed decomposi- 
tion of average cost growth attributed to changes in parameter values and 
input prices.  In other  words, we  decompose the upward  or downward 
shifting of the average cost curve into a number of contributing sources. 
Since the average cost curve depends on the output level, we  choose its 
minimum as a benchmark by which the shifting of the curve is assessed. 
10.5  Discussion of Results 
We have estimated the three-input two-output profit function discussed 
in section 10.4 by using 1993-96  panel data for twenty-four of the thirty- 
one locally incorporated banks in Hong K~ng.~  New regulations on dis- 
closure have  made much  more  data available for this  period.  Foreign 
banks are excluded because they do not have to comply with the same 
disclosure requirements as local banks. Parameters of the profit function 
are estimated both for the before- and after-deregulation periods. They 
are reported in appendix table 10A.  1. The demand-supply elasticity matri- 
ces for the two periods are presented in tables 10A.2 and 10A.3. We shall 
refer to the set of parameters for 1993-94  as Sl and that for 1995-96  as 
S2. The Chow test in table 10A.l rejects the null hypothesis of no struc- 
tural shift of the parameters. 
The structural shift reveals that the banks’ responses go far beyond al- 
tering input-output proportions. Humphrey and Pulley (1997) summarize 
three primary responses from banks that explain the deregulation-induced 
structural change in banks’ production technology. The first response is 
cost offset and cost reduction. The second response is to transfer some of 
the higher funding cost and interest rate risk to borrowers (via floating- 
3. Excluded are mainly investment banks with one or two offices. Their behavior is signifi- 
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rate  loans)  and  to  purchasers  of  securities  (by  securitizing  fixed-rate 
loans). The third response is to expand asset risk in order to reap a higher 
expected return on loans to a more concentrated, but riskier, set of bor- 
rowers. Banks have also become more aggressive in developing and mar- 
keting their services (Carse 1995a). The differences between the two sets 
of  parameters  therefore  reflect  the  changing  strategies  of  optimizing 
banks. These banks have to adjust their strategies because the environ- 
ment is changing. 
The profit function formulation assumes perfect competition. Banks are 
price takers and input-output prices constitute the environment. Deregu- 
lation changes the interest rate, which is one of the prices, and therefore 
affects the environment. We shall refer to the set of prices in the first pe- 
riod as El and that in the second as E2. 
By  having two sets of strategy parameters and two sets of environment 
variables, we  have four different scenarios. We can calculate the profit of 
an average bank under different scenarios by substituting the four combi- 
nations of values into the profit function. We  use sample means of the 
price data for the purpose. Table 10.4  presents the results in a 2 X 2 matrix. 
It is readily seen that  there  is substantial growth in  profits (6.0903 - 
5.8088, the logarithmic difference) by going down the diagonal, or from 
S1-El to S2-E2. This indicates that given the new environment and the 
new strategies, banks actually made more profits after the deregulation, a 
phenomenon consistent with what we  observed earlier in table 10.1. 
The more interesting results are, however, the counterfactual cases of 
S2-El and Sl-E2, which isolate the marginal effects of deregulation and 
banks’ responses. Given the new environment E2, if the average bank does 
not adjust its strategies to S2, then (log) profits will decrease by 5.8088 - 
5.5115 = 0.2973. In other words, the marginal impact of deregulation is 
to reduce an average bank’s profits by  about 30 percent. Comparing the 
two strategies S1 and S2 under the new environment E2, we  see that the 
new  strategy is able to raise profits by 6.0903 -  5.5115 = 0.5788, which 
more than offsets the erosion in profits due to deregulation. Similarly, one 
can obtain a second decomposition  of observed profit growth by  going 
through the route from S1-El to S2-El and then to S2-E2. It should be 
noted that profits in S2-El are larger than in S1-El. There is the question 
of why the bank chooses S1 rather than S2 when the environment is El. 
Such a seemingly suboptimal choice signals that there must be some hid- 
Table 10.4  Average Bank’s Profit in Different Scenarios (logarithmic values) 
El  E2 
s1  5.8088  5.5115 
s2  6.4217  6.0903 316  Yum  K. Kwan and Francis T.  Lui 
den cost to adopting S2. In view of the operating characteristics of finan- 
cial intermediaries, this is likely to be the cost of risk. 
To understand better the relative impact of E2 and S2 on banks’ profits, 
we  construct another table. In table  10.5, we  decompose the growth in 
profits of an average firm into its sources. The higher interest cost caused 
a significant decline in profits due to deposits (-0.3282),  but this was com- 
pletely offset by the banks’ new strategies on deposits (1.1963). Much of 
the growth in profits related to the environment was due to income from 
providing services (0.1428). It is also readily seen from the table that banks 
also modified their strategies to take advantage of the services component 
of profits. The increase in profits due to services in the strategies column 
was 0.7775. Apparently, banks increased their labor and capital costs and 
mobilized resources away from loans to expand in the market of providing 
bank services. These include income from commissions and fees derived 
from  foreign exchange trading,  credit cards,  trading  investments,  and 
other types of services. The new strategy seems to be successful and reason- 
able. When businesses related to the interest rate are negatively affected, 
competitive banks look for profit opportunities in other areas. The rapid 
introduction  of  new  banking  services in  Hong  Kong  during  the  past 
few  years is  a testimony  to the responsive and flexible  nature of  local 
banks. 
An implicit assumption in deriving table 10.5 is that all the factors of 
production are variable. It may be argued that since the duration of the 
period under study is too short, we  should not assume that banks are in 
their long-run equilibrium. An alternative is to treat capital stock as a 
fixed input factor of production. We can then estimate a short-run profit 
function in a similar way.  This has been implemented, and we  find that 
the results discussed above are robust. To conserve space, we  do not pro- 
vide the details. 
Results from estimating the cost function provide us with additional 









Strategies  Environment 
0.0487  -0.0934 
-0.0764  0.0194 
1.1963  -0.3282 
-1.2133  -0.0550 
0.7775  0.1428 
-0.1369  0.0000 






-  1.2683 
-0.1369 
0.2815 
Note: The values are logarithmic differences of profits. If multiplied by  100, each entry can 
be approximated as the part of the profit growth rate that is due to changes in the corre- 
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Table 10.6  Sources of Average Cost Growth 
Source  Strategies  Environment  Total 
Labor  0.0385  0.0157  0.0542 
Capital  0.0559  -0.0063  0.0496 
Deposits  -0.1303  0.2474  0.1171 
Residual  0.0117  0  0.01 17 
Total  -0.0242  0.2568  0.2326 
Note: The values are logarithmic differences of average costs. If multiplied by  100, each entry 
can be approximated as the part of the growth rate of average cost that is due to changes in 
the corresponding factors. 
information for understanding how banks responded to interest rate de- 
regulation. The data sources for the estimation are the same as those for 
the profit function. Again we divide the period in two: 1993-94  and 1995- 
96. Estimates of the parameters are reported in appendix table 10A.4. The 
Chow test that we perform also rejects the null hypothesis that there is no 
structural shift in the parameters. 
Table  10.6 shows the decomposition of the sources of growth of the 
industry’s minimum  average cost. Changes in  the environment  caused 
(minimum) average cost to go up by  23.26 percent. The new  strategies 
only reduced cost by 2.42 percent. It appears the banks did not focus too 
much on cost reduction. Rather, as discussed above, they became more 
aggressive in expanding their businesses. The single most important factor 
that raised cost was the interest cost for bank deposits (24.74 percent). 
Banks were only able to mitigate part of the increase through their new 
strategies on deposits (-13.03  percent). It is interesting to note that the 
prices of labor and capital in the environment remained stable, but banks 
chose to raise these costs further. This phenomenon is consistent with the 
picture discussed earlier. Banks strategically expanded into the business of 
banking services, which is input intensive in both labor and capital. The 
residual term reported in table  10.6 is 1.17 percent. This means that in 
addition to the changes in the prices of labor, capital, and deposits, there 
was an unexplained exogenous increase in cost due to other changes in 
the environment. 
Some interesting results on how banks responded to the deregulation 
can be seen in figure 10.1, which depicts the industry’s average cost curves 
under the four different scenarios mentioned earlier. The cost function of 
Sl-El is above that of S2-El.  The banks could have lowered cost by choos- 
ing the new strategies even if the deregulation had not occurred. This re- 
sult also appears in the profit function discussed earlier. It signals that the 
new strategies associated with expanding bank services raise the risks of 
the banks. 
Another observation from figure 10.1 is that the new strategies appear 318  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T.  Lui 
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to have flattened the cost curves. This observation is also supported by the 
statistical test. If the curvature flattens, then the estimate for one of the 
parameters, Pry, will go down after the deregulation. The result in table 
10A.4 supports this hypothesis. The parameter decreases from 0.0949 to 
0.0541, and the difference is statistically significant. The flattening of the 
cost curves can be explained by the fact that competition increased. Banks 
have recently also engaged in more networking activities among them- 
selves  so as to take advantage of  any possible economies of  scale. The 
flattening of the cost functions may indicate that banks are moving closer 
to constant returns to scale. 
The main message we  get from the empirical results is that banks in 
Hong Kong seem to be very  responsive to changes in the environment 
and, in this case, the deregulation itself. Their efforts to cut costs did not 
seem to be successful and they chose the more aggressive strategy of ex- 
panding business. We therefore expect their risks to have gone up. To for- 
mally test for it, we  turn to the next section. 
10.6  Changes in Risks 
In section 10.5 we  only discussed the effects of the deregulation on the 
costs and  profits of  the banks. Without  knowing what  happens to the 
banks' risks, we  cannot conclude that they are better off even when their 
profits have increased. In what follows, we  shall make use  of a standard 
CAPM to find out whether the market believes that the risks of the banks 
went up after the deregulation (cf. Brooks, Faff, and Ho 1997). Deregulation, Profit, and Cost in Commercial Banking in Hong Kong  319 
Our estimate of  the changes in bank risks is  based on the following 
return-generating process of the CAPM (e.g., see Sharpe and Alexander 
1990; Ross 1994): 
(16)  R, -  R*  =  a, + P,(R, - R*) + E~, 
where RI  is the rate of return of bank i, R*  is the rate of return of a risk- 
free asset, R, is the rate of return of a general market portfolio, and E, is 
the random error term associated with bank  i.  The coefficients a and 
can be estimated. If the value of a,  also known as Jensen’s a,  is nonzero, 
the security of bank i is mispriced. To  see whether the market is efficient, 
we  can perform a test for the value of a.  The value of p tells us how the 
market evaluates the risks of the bank. The higher the value of  p,  the 
higher the risks associated with the bank. 
If  a bank chose a riskier position after the deregulation,  then  its p 
should have gone up. We  collect monthly share price data for all banks 
listed on the Hong Kong stock market for the period from June 1992 to 
March 1997.4  Monthly rates of return for every bank can be derived from 
these prices. The market  portfolio  rate  of  return,  R,,  is  derived from 
monthly changes in the Hang Seng Index, which tracks Hong Kong’s blue- 
chip stockss  We use the Fed funds rate to derive the risk-free monthly rate 
of return, R*. To implement a test for the change in p,  we  can add to 
equation (16) a dummy variable (D)  with value equal to one from January 
1995 to March 1997 and zero before this period: 
(17)  R, - R”  =  a, + (p, + y,D)(RM  - R*) + E~, 
The bigger the increase in risks, the bigger the value of y. 
Table 10.7 summarizes the estimations based on equation (17). There 
are altogether twelve banks listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. We 
have eliminated one of these, the Hong Kong Bank, because it has very 
significant overseas profits that are not affected by the interest rate deregu- 
lation. The list in table 10.7 is ranked according to the market shares of 
the remaining eleven banks. Several results emerge from the table. 
First, the t-values of Jensen’s a for all eleven banks are insignificant. We 
cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal to zero. The securities for 
all the banks appear to have been efficiently priced both before and after 
the deregulation.  This suggests that the economic profits of the eleven 
banks are all zero, implying that  the increase in bank costs due to the 
deregulation was offset by the banks’ efforts to raise revenue. Second, the 
t-values of p for all the banks are highly significant, which is a reasonable 
4. The electronic financial database Extel provides the necessary data (Financial Times 
5. We have properly taken care of dividends and other distributions in computing the rates 
1997). 
of return for the banks and the Hang Seng Index. 320  Yum K. Kwan  and Francis T.  Lui 
Table 10.7  Estimates of Changes in Risks 
























































0.3649  0.634 
I.  78** 
0.4143  0.582 
1.93** 
1.077  0.373 
2.74*** 
0.2263  0.633 
0.72 
0.1665  0.494 
0.64 
0.2223  0.564 
0.98 
0.4664  0.452 
1.4I* 
0.592  0.52 
1.63* 
0.8637  0.488 
2.39*** 
0.2022  0.56 
0.59 
0.7273  0.329 
2.07* ** 
Note: Numbers in italics are t-values. 
*One-tail significance at the 10 percent level. 
**One-tail significance at the 5 percent level. 
***One-tail significance at the 2.5 percent level. 
result. Third, the t-values for five of the ys are significant at the 5 percent 
or 2.5  percent levels, while two of them are significant at the 10 percent 
level. Although four of the banks do not have a significant y, it should be 
noted that the ys for all eleven banks are uniformly positive in sign. These 
results do suggest that the market believes that the risks of all the banks 
increased. Risk changes for some of the banks may not be as strong as for 
others because their strategies may have been different. 
The empirical tests from this section support the hypothesis that banks 
in Hong Kong were more willing to accept risks after the deregulation. 
Alternatively, at least the market believes that the more competitive envi- 
ronment will create or has created more risks for the banks. This should 
be regarded as a trade-off for the increase in profits of the banks. 
10.7  Concluding Remarks 
In  this paper, we  have examined the changes in profits and costs of 
Hong Kong’s banking industry after the interest rate deregulation from Deregulation,  Profit, and Cost in Commercial Banking in Hong Kong  321 
late 1994 to early  1995. It is found that  the banks in our sample were 
all efficiently priced and did not make excess profits before or after the 
deregulation. Our decomposition analysis shows that banks were respon- 
sive to changes in the environment. They made significant adjustments in 
their business strategies. Within the constraints of the banking production 
technology, banks were relatively unsuccessful in mitigating the erosion in 
profits by  cost reduction. They instead chose to increase profits by ex- 
panding  their  businesses into relatively interest-independent bank  ser- 
vices. 
In terms of maintaining growth in profits, the strategy was successful. 
However, we  have also found that the risks associated with most of the 
banks  increased  after  the  interest  rate  cap  was  removed.  Apparently, 
changes in interest costs induced them to go deeper into a business that 
they had been  less keen about earlier. Probably because of the general 
financial health of the economy in the sample period, the increase in risks 
has not brought about any major crisis yet. The absence of an insurance 
system for bank deposits and the new regulations on disclosure should 
also have restrained the banks from taking extremely risky positions. 
The process of the deregulation was carried out cautiously in several 
phases. This gave the banks more time to absorb the shocks and cope 
with the changes. This could be one of the reasons why the transition was 
relatively smooth even though the Mexican crisis and the Barings incident 
occurred in the beginning phases of the deregulation. However, from the 
analysis in this paper, there seems to have been another reason that was 
more fundamental. Having operated in a free market environment for a 
long time, the banks were very nimble in finding new opportunities. This 
ability has been important in the past and most likely will continue to be 
important for the banks’ survival in the future. 322  Yum K. Kwan and Francis T.  Lui 
Appendix 
Table 10A.l  Profit Function 
Before Deregulation:  After Deregulation: 
1993-94  1995-96 
ML  Standard  ML  Standard 
Parameter  Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error 
Pa  1  0.6  1 04  0.2564  10.4735  0.2050 
PI  -0.2199  0.1634  -0.3056  0.0999 
P2  -0.0982  0.0403  -0.0758  0.0252 
P3  -2.1803  0.2412  -2.8537  0.2185 
P4  0.5537  0.1979  1.6257  0.1689 
PI,  -0.3792  0.0835  -  0.249  1  0.0584 
P21  -0.0378  0.0204  -0.0207  0.0133 
PZ,  -0.0575  0.0087  -0.0183  0.0058 
P3l  0.0641  0.1141  0.3750  0.0939 
P3,  -0.0783  0.0335  -0.0108  0.0276 
P33  -  1.5320  0.2420  -0.6824  0.291  3 
Pb,  0.1207  0.0286  0.0288  0.0188 
Pb,  1.0633  0.1824  0.3169  0.1900 
Pa  -0.1739  0.2247  0.3477  0.1999 
Log likelihood  332.5182  383.3432 
Sample size  48  46 
Note: Using the pooled sample of all 94 observations gives a log likelihood of 655.1992. The 
likelihood ratio statistic LR = -2(655.1992  -  332.5182 -  383.3432) = 121.3244 rejects the 
null hypothesis of no structural shift at any reasonable significance level for a x2  distribution 
with 15 degrees of freedom. 
P4,  0.3224  0.0963  0.0018  0.0644 
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Note: Entry (i,j)  = aln x,ldlnp,, where xI = labor, x2 = capital, x, = deposits, x4 = loans, 
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Note: Entry (i, j)  = Jln x,/Jlnp,, where xI = labor, x2 = capital, x3 = deposits, x4 = loans, 
and x5  = services. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Table lOA.4  Cost Function 
Before Deregulation:  After Deregulation: 
1993-94  1995-96 
ML  Standard  ML  Standard 
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Note: Using the pooled sample of all 94 observations gives a log likelihood of 856.2420. The 
likelihood ratio statistic LR = -2(856.2420 -  429.1103 -  456.8197) = 59.3760 rejects the 
null hypothesis of no structural shift at any reasonable significance level for a x2  distribution 
with 10 degrees of freedom. 
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Comment  Moon-Soo Kang 
The Hong Kong Association of Banks cautiously implemented the process 
of interest rate deregulation in several steps in the 1990s. Kwan  and Lui 
argue that the transition was relatively smooth in Hong Kong. However, 
their sample period (1995-96)  may  be too short for them to claim that 
Hong Kong banks responded optimally to the interest rate deregulation 
in 1993-94. 
Foreign banks are excluded from this study. It would be interesting to 
investigate how foreign banks responded when local banks raised lending 
and deposit rates in Hong Kong. The paper does not tell us what hap- 
pened to local banks’ market shares after they raised lending rates. 
Moon-Soo Kang is senior fellow at the Korea Development Institute. Deregulation, Profit, and Cost in Commercial Banking in Hong Kong  325 
The paper  argues that local banks  expanded into riskier businesses. 
However, it does not show how much nonperforming loans of local banks 
increased after local banks  adopted new  business strategies. When the 
Hong Kong economy suffers from economic downturns in coming years, 
local banks may see a considerable increase in nonperforming loans, as 
Korea has in recent years. 
The paper does not tell why  local banks in Hong Kong have not been 
successful in cutting operating costs. Korean commercial banks saw op- 
erating profits shrink in recent years when the Korean economy went sour 
because they could not reduce labor and other operating costs. 